Viva Chile: The United States and the Chilean Coup of 1973

In the United States, September 11, 2001 is a date equated with terrible tragedy. Virtually every American who lived through that event remembers with horror they felt when they first saw the images of the burning Trade Towers and the Pentagon. That appalling event has been forever seared into the collective memory of American society in too many ways to mention. And though 9/11 has been unofficially claimed as a American day of mourning, the date has an even older meaning for a nation that is often forgotten in the muddle of world affairs. Twenty-eight years earlier, on September 11, 1973, the Chilean nation watched in disbelief as General Agusto Pinochet led an orchestrated coup to overthrow their socialist president Salvador Allende. With the same bewilderment that captivated Americans at the sight of the Trade Towers collapsing, the Chilean people were mesmerized as they witnessed the destruction of their government’s headquarters, known as La Moneda. They listened intently to Radio Agricultura’s broadcast of President Allende’s final words: “Viva Chile!” Shortly thereafter, Chileans came to the realization that September 11 would be a hallmark day in their own history, even though it is currently overshadowed by America’s tragedy.

How and why the Chilean Golpe del Estado (the Chilean coup) took place is both complicated and controversial. The convoluted makeup of Chilean politics, along with its struggling economy were certainly factors in the eventual overthrow, but they do not tell the whole story. Chile also found itself thrown onto the major stage of international politics, caught in a virtual tug-o-war between rival nations. Once the Marxist agenda of presidential candidate Salvador Allende gained serious support, the United States felt forced to intervene to protect its own interests. It was the political divisions within Chile, combined with the involvement of U.S. interests in shaping Chilean politics that created an atmosphere of political tension, and was the major catalyst for the Chilean coup of 1973.

While it is true that the shaping of Chilean politics and government began in the nineteenth century, the major factors are more modern. During the 1960s and 1970s, Chile was a nation with a strong tradition of democratic elections and practices. By the early 1960s, Chilean politics had become diverse and complex. Five major political parties had formed within Chile, each promising economic prosperity to the people: The extreme right of Chilean politics consisted of the liberals and conservatives, who merged to form the National Party, the Radical Party and the Christian Democratic Party were predominantly centrist parties, and the Socialist and Communist Parties made up the extreme left. The majority of Chilean people during the early 1960s favored the center of the political spectrum, in particular the Christian Democratic Party. In 1964 the party won the Chilean presidency with the strong leadership of Eduardo Frei. Frei promised the Chilean people sweeping reforms and economic prosperity. By the latter end of the decade, however, the party had lost momentum. Their inability to establish a coalition with the Radical Party (the party that most closely shared their views) spelled the beginning of the end for the Democratic Christian Party.

The economy also remained a problematic issue for the Chilean government. Compared to other Latin American nations, the Chilean economy was at the higher echelon, but was also on the decline. Soaring inflation rates festered the Chilean economy. In fact, From 1972-1974, Chilean inflation rates were the worst on the planet. The Democratic Christian Party had worked tirelessly to redirect the course of the economy, but met with only minimal success. As a result, the door was opened to the other political parties to seize power.

By 1970, Chilean politics were ripe for change. The political left began gaining new support for its agenda, promising a new prosperous era for the nation. At the head of the Socialist agenda was Salvador Allende. Allende had been in government for many years, and had even run for President three times before. His agenda had always lacked the support that the Democratic Christians enjoyed, and as a result, Allende was never able to achieve the presidency.

The Presidential election of 1970 gave Allende and the Socialists a golden opportunity to finally win. The political right of Chilean politics had lost support, and President Frei of the Democratic Christians was unable to run again for the presidency (the Chilean constitution allowed a person to serve as President for one term of six years). With Frei’s departure, the Democratic Christians had nobody as popular to run against Allende. The left nominated Jorge Alessandri, a former Chilean president, while the Democratic Christians nominated the unknown and unpopular Radomiro Tomic. For once it looked as though Allende had a serious chance to win the election

International reaction to the Chilean election was diverse. The United States took a strong stance opposing the Allende campaign. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger stated that Allende’s strongest ambition was for Chile and Cuba to unite, and to “create the revolution in Latin America.” The very idea that socialist governments could spring up in Latin America was unacceptable to the United States, which had already been embroiled in problems with Cuba. To make matters worse, Allende, in the words of Kissinger, desired to “undermine U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere by violence if necessary.” Kissinger’s concerns with Salvador Allende’s intentions prove problematic, when compared with the statements of the U.S. ambassador to Chile. In January of 1970 Edward Korry, the U.S ambassador to Chile, told the Nixon Administration that the dangers Chile posed to the United States were greatly exaggerated. “I see little that will endanger U.S. real interests in the country, in the area, or in the hemisphere.” Kissinger’s attitudes toward Chilean government officials also indicate a level of arrogance. In a meeting with Gabriel Valdes, the Chilean foreign minister, Kissinger stated that, “Nothing important can come from the South…The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, and crosses over to Washington.” Valdes replied to Kissinger’s comments with, “Mr. Kissinger, you know nothing of the South.” Kissinger then rudely ended the conversation with, “And I don’t care.”

Despite Kissinger’s comments that the Southern hemisphere was irrelevant in world affairs, the Nixon Administration clearly took note of what was transpiring in Chile. Allende’s promises to nationalize the Chilean copper mines and other assets unnerved White House officials. American businesses within Chile (particularly in the copper industry) quickly developed a sense of fear that if Allende were to win, they would lose all they had worked for.

It was under these circumstances that the Nixon Administration decided to act. President Nixon authorized the CIA to provide any needed support to oppose Allende. This entailed monetary aid given to Allende’s opponents. The aid given to Allende’s opponents was in response to the alleged aid given to Allende from Cuba. The CIA had reported that Cuba had pumped $350,000 into the Allende campaign, and that Fidel Castro himself was helping to lead the charge to get Allende elected. For the United States, it seemed as though Chile was the stage for a much greater, and on-going fight with Communism.

Despite the efforts of the CIA and other U.S. officials, Salvador Allende was democratically elected the president of Chile on September 4, 1970. The official election results gave Allende 36% of the vote, while Alessandri gained 34% and Tomic 27%. Regardless of the fact that Allende had won in a constitutionally and democratically sound election, the Nixon Administration still saw his elections as, “a challenge to our national interest.” The mere thought that a second Cuba could be on the horizon caused U.S. officials to find another solution to the Chilean crisis. As Henry Kissinger stated, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”

It was under these circumstances that the Nixon Administration and the CIA corroborated with Chilean officials to seek an alternative to Allende. Initially, it was hoped that a loophole in the Chilean Constitution would provide the answer. According to the Chilean Constitution, any president elected without a majority (51%) had to be elected in the Chilean Congress. Tradition had always obligated the Congress to affirm the winner of the popular vote, but under these circumstances, the U.S. hoped to change precedence. The plan called for the Chilean Congress to elect the runner up (Alessandri) to the Presidency. Alessandri would then step down, and another election (one in which former president Eduardo Frei would be eligible for) would be held. The United States banked on the hope that Frei’s popularity, coupled with U.S. backing, would carry him past Allende in the new elections. President Nixon justified the U.S. response by pointing out the fact that Allende had only been elected by 1/3 of the popular vote. Nixon also stated that the U.S. had every right to conduct secret operations in other nations to protect U.S. interests, since the Soviets were doing the same thing. Despite the intentions of the United States, Soviets, and Cubans, the fact remains that nobody seemed to care that the Chilean people had voted democratically.

It is strange even today to think that the United State, a nation that presumably devotes all its efforts to defend democracy and liberty for all, would go to such great lengths to suppress that very process in Chile. In his memoirs, President Nixon explained this by stating the following:

We live in a far from ideal world. As long as Communists supply external funds to support political parties, factions or individuals in other countries, I believe the U.S. can and should do the same and do it secretly so that it can be effective. Under Communists standards, of morality, governments are meant to be subverted and elections influenced. To me it would have been the height of immorality to allow the Soviets, the Cubans, and other Communist nations to interfere with impunity in free elections while America stayed its hand.

Clearly, Nixon felt justified in impeding a democratic election simply because a rival was involved. This serves as a perfect example of the complexity of U.S. foreign affairs during the Cold War.

Despite the best efforts of U.S. officials to persuade the Chilean Congress not to vote for Allende, the Chilean Congress followed precedent and elected him president. Before his election, however, congress obligated Allende to agree to certain terms that would guarantee the future security of Chilean democracy. In response to his election, the Nixon Administration debated on the proper course of action. Edward Korry, the U.S. ambassador to Chile, had suggested to the White House that a coup involving the Chilean military was a possibility. This excited members of the Nixon Administration, who were still simmering over the Allende election. Korry’s plan called for the CIA to help fund several high-ranking generals in the Chilean Army to organize and overthrow President Allende. Once accomplished, the Chilean government would be able to hold new elections.

Unfortunately for U.S. officials, the plan to overthrow Allende via a military coup was shot down. Korry reported to the White House that most Chilean generals were unwilling to conspire or accept bribes from the United States, and that most generals simply wanted to “adjust” to Allende’s agenda. Rene Schneider, Commanding General of the Army, was a particular problem to the plan. Schneider had promised earlier that any effort of the Congress to disallow Allende the presidency would meet with his disapproval. Schneider also made his stance clear that he strongly supported the Chilean election process, and would not allow anything to interfere with the will of the people. Just a few days after making such comments, General Schneider was killed in an attempted kidnapping. Chilean officials immediately blamed the U.S. and CIA for the assassination, claiming it was backed by U.S. funds. Even though Nixon and Kissinger denied involvement, CIA records indicated that the U.S. did indeed provide weapons and funding. Despite the many efforts of the U.S. to oust Allende, it looked as though he was there to stay.

The reality that Allende was going to maintain his power was almost too much for the White House to bear. Henry Kissinger had even claimed that Allende’s rise to power, “posed for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere.” Kissinger had made it clear to President Nixon that Allende’s victory caused unimaginable “political and psychological losses to the U.S.” Under these circumstances, the Nixon Administration took a hard stance against the Allende government. The U.S. government maintained close contact with Chilean military officials that were against Allende, and adopted strong economic strategies meant to choke the already struggling Chilean economy. American businessmen were warned to stay away, due to the unstable government, and Chile was quickly subjected to economic isolation.

At first Allende’s government gave a glimmer of hope to the Chilean people. During his first year in power the Chilean economy experienced unprecedented growth. Salary readjustment laws put more money in the pockets of Chilean citizens, gross national product surged 8.3%, industrial production soared 12.1%, unemployment fell 8.3%, and inflation dropped dramatically. Much of the sudden economic prosperity can be credited to Allende’s nationalization of the Chilean copper industry.

Chile’s economic prosperity did not last for long. After 1972, inflation began to rise and unemployment returned to previous levels. Allende’s inability to maintain the economic prosperity of 1972 was mostly due to American economic boycotts and a dramatic drop in the price of copper worldwide. The White House received constant information on the Chilean situation and was elated at the fact that Allende’s world seemed to be crumbling. Quickly, the United States moved to capitalize on Chile’s economic misfortune. The CIA dumped more than $6 million dollars to aid Allende’s opponents in the Chilean government, particularly in the military. The U.S. also hoped that the new Chilean Congress would move to impeach Allende based on his recent failures. Though impeachment efforts proved futile, U.S. officials were pleased to learn that many Chilean military officials were considering a coup. The Chilean economy had been pushed to the brink, massive protests had irrupted in the streets, and Allende seemed more like a deer in the headlights than the brave leader Chileans had hoped for.

The end came quickly for Allende. On September 11, 1973, Chilean military forces under the direction of Agusto Pinochet took control of the capital. Allende, who was hunkered down in the Presidential headquarters (La Moneda) gave his final farewell to the nation. Shortly thereafter, Allende found dead. Allegedly, Allende had shot himself with the very rifle given to him by his Cuban hero Fidel Castro. The Nixon Administration responded to the coup by claiming it had no involvement. Henry Kissinger commented that United States, “does not support revolutions as a means of settling disputes.” White House officials gave support for the Pinochet coup, calling the General “mild-mannered, businesslike, hard working, honest and dedicated.” Even when reports that Pinochet had ordered the deaths of thousands of Chilean people, Henry Kissinger claimed that Pinochet was simply dealing with “lingering terrorism.” Instead of being called a ruthless usurper of power, Pinochet was hailed as a patriot, called to protect his mother country. Whether they admit it or not, the Nixon Administration had participated (in one form or another) in the successful overthrow of a democratically elected government, and saw that government replaced with a military dictatorship.

The story of the Chilean coup of 1973 is deeply controversial and complicated. There is no doubt that much of this story is still yet to be unraveled. As time has passed, Chilean people (and people around the world) have divided opinions of Allende, U.S. involvement in Chile, and Pinochet. Some see Allende as a villain, while Pinochet is seen as a liberator. Others see Allende as a martyr and the United States as an evil empire, pushing its agenda on weaker nations. Regardless of personal feelings, the Chilean coup of 1973 serves as a perfect example of the complex world of U.S. foreign policy. The complex world of Chilean politics, the emergence of Allende and his agenda, and the involvement of the United States to protect its interests all molded together to create the coup of 1973. One can only hope that current and future leaders will learn from past events like Chile. Perhaps then we will think twice before getting involved in other nation’s affairs to protect our “interests.”

Tea Parties: 18th Century v. 21st Century

Unless you have been living under a rock, you are aware of the sudden emergence of the "tea party" movements that have captured the attention of many "super conservatives" this past year. In the spirit of the original tea party of old, many of these new activists fancy themselves as revolutionaries who are crying out in the dark for freedom from oppression and tyranny.

But just how similar are the "tea parties" of today with those of old?

Comparing the Boston Tea Party to the various tea parties that have taken place across the nation in recent months is complex to say the least. After all, we're trying to compare 18th century America with today's society. Most of the social, cultural, and technological norms are completely different now. The majority of early Americans wouldn't even recognize modern America as being their "stomping ground." This is probably the most important (and obvious) distinction to make, especially when we consider just how much tea party pundits (most notably Glenn Beck) have tried to cast the founders in a modern light.

With that said, here are a few specific differences between the tea parties of today and the original tea party of 1773:

1. First off, the legacy of the Boston Tea Party (1773) has been used on a number of occasions. In fact, Mahondas Gandhi (not Mahatma Gandhi) invoked the legacy of the Boston Tea Party in 1908 by inspiring his fellow Indians to burn British registration cards. In the early 1970s there were a large number of gatherings that called themselves "tea parties." At one “I Love America” rally led by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, followers were asked to burn bags of tea, symbolizing the people’s anger over the newly-enacted Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade. In 1973, the 200th anniversary of the Boston Tea Party, protestors gathered at the White House to call for the impeachment of then President Richard Nixon by throwing bags of tea on the White House lawn. In 1998, two conservative US Congressmen put the federal tax code into a chest marked "tea" and dumped it into the harbor. And finally, in 2006 a breakoff of the Libertarian Party called the “Boston Tea Party” was founded.

2. The motivations behind today’s tea parties and the original tea party of 1773 are completely different. The Boston Tea Party (1773) was actually a protest AGAINST a corporate tax cut, as opposed to today’s tea parties which protested rising taxes and an increase of government spending, etc. In 1773, The British East India Company was nearly bankrupt and instead of providing a "bailout" or government loan, Parliament passed the Tea Act, which eliminated for this company the duty on tea exported to America. As a result, smaller merchants in the colonies were expected to suffer, since they didn’t received the same tax cuts as the East India Company. The Boston Tea Party was the peak of a boycott against a company that got huge corporate tax cuts granted to them by the government. Once the ships from the East India Company arrived in Boston’s harbor, men like Samuel Adams and John Hancock were quick to seize the opportunity and turn it into a political advantage by rallying local Boston merchants to their cause. On December 16, after assembling at the Old South Church to express their grievances, Samuel Adams stood and gave the “secret message” to his devout “Sons of Liberty” (and Masons) to assemble at the docks, where they had their “tea party.” 342 chests of tea (property of the East India Company) were seized and dumped into Boston Harbor.

Now, this is often contrary to what many people know about the Boston Tea Party. After all, most Americans believe that the American Revolution was the result of taxes being levied against them by Britain. This isn’t 100% accurate. To understand the role that taxes played in the American Revolution we must go back to 1765. The British Empire, fresh of its complete rout of the French in the French and Indian War, was faced with a mounting debt as a result of that war. As a result, Parliament decided to levy a small tax (roughly one percent) against the colonists in America. Parliament believed that the colonists needed to play off a small portion of Britain’s debt, since the war had been fought to protect the colonists in the first place. As a result, the STAMP ACT was passed. However, the colonists exploded in anger and protested the act. Led by Boston Revolutionary Samuel Adams, the colonists succeeded in having the Stamp Act repealed. One of the main reasons for their success was their usage of the old propaganda phrase, “No taxation without representation,” which had been coined in 1750 by Reverend John Mayhew. By repealing the Stamp Act, the colonists believed they had succeeded and that everything would be ok.

The colonists’ excitement, however, was to be short-lived. In 1766 Parliament passed the often forgotten DECLARATORY ACT, which stated that Parliament had the right and power to govern its colonies, “in all cases whatsoever.” In essence, this became the catalyst for the revolution. It created a “showdown” between the legitimacy of Parliament’s rule and the sovereignty of the colonies. In fact, Thomas Jefferson would quote the Declaratory Act several times in the Declaration of Independence.

So, while taxes were an issue early on, it is important to recognize that they played a very limited role in bringing about the American Revolution.

3. The Boston Tea Party was an illegal action of a mob that committed assault, theft, destruction of property, etc. The tea parties of today did no such thing (at least to my knowledge). The Boston Tea Party was literally an act of defiance to the laws of the British. The participants were willfully and knowingly being insubordinate to the will of King and country. The results of their actions caused the British to impose a complete blockade of Boston Harbor. Today’s tea parties, while an expression of anger/intolerance of current government decisions, do not invoke the same response nor do they take the same radical steps of defiance.

4. Today’s tea party participants claim that their petition was a “grass roots” movement led and organized by the people, a claim that is hotly debated by many. The Boston Tea Party, however, was not. It was led by prominent and influential Bostonians like Samuel Adams and the VEEEERY rich John Hancock, who, interestingly enough, stood to lose a fortune by the East India Company. His motives were not as pure as we are often taught.

5. The Boston Tea Party was NOT assembled out of a growing concern over the size of government, government spending, etc. Instead it was assembled on issues like colonial sovereignty v. Parliamentary rule, corporate tax breaks, and a lack of government funding for the development of the American merchant class. In fact, this last point (the development of the American merchant class) was a fundamental issue for Thomas Paine in his extremely influential pamphlet, “Common Sense.” It’s worth noting that political activist Glenn Beck has quoted Thomas Paine on several occasions, especially during the tea parties of the last year. However, Beck neglects to recognize the fact that Paine was IN FAVOR of bigger government, more government spending, higher taxes, welfare programs, etc.

And while the differences between the tea parties of today and the Boston Tea Party of 1773 are vast, it’s important to remember that at the heart they share the same basic principle: that the people are where sovereignty and power ultimately reside…at least that is the hope of its participants, whether in the 18th or 21st century. And it’s likely that we haven’t seen the end to the legacy of the Boston Tea Party!!!

Book Review: The Making of a Catholic President

Originally posted for the Religion in American History Blog

Shaun Casey's new book, The Making of a Catholic President: Kennedy v. Nixon 1960, examines how religion -- in this particular case, Catholicism -- became the predominant issue in the presidential election of 1960. In addition, Casey explores how both Nixon and Kennedy used the "religion question" to their benefit, and how a plethora of prominent religious figures took to the stage of national politics, in an effort to "protect" the American democratic process.

From the beginning, Casey attempts to resurrect the anti-Catholic sentiment that permeated American politics during the early part of the 20th century. By invoking the "Ghost" of Al Smith, Casey effectively recreates the tumultuous political environment that Kennedy was to face head-on during his bid for the White House. With Kennedy emerging as a front-runner to the presidency, Protestant organizations, leaders, and media outlets embarked on a collaboration to shed light on the perceived "dangers" of a Catholic at the head of a democratically elected government. As Casey states:

Two substantive considerations were feeding their fears. First, the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church was at variance with American conceptions of religious liberty and of church-state relations. Might a Catholic president be used by a politically powerful church? Second, there were policy issues on which there was a Catholic position, and a Catholic president might steer national policy in those directions (55).

As debates over issues like birth control, funding for private schools, and a possible American ambassador to the Vatican began to rise, so did the fears of Protestants, who were quick to remind the American populace of past papal declarations (specifically those of Leo XIII), which had "decried the separation of church and state as a shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism" and "called for Catholics to penetrate wherever possible into the administrations of their countries' civil affairs" (138). As a result, the efforts of organizations like Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (POAU), ensured that the anti-Catholic sentiment that had led to the demise of Al Smith's political ambitions was again positioned to strike a fatal blow at Kennedy's run for the White House.

Despite the obvious hostility to a Catholic president, Casey points out that the Kennedy camp made a concerted effort to reach out to Protestants, in the hopes of gaining understanding and support. Casey writes:

Kennedy displayed a nimble and sophisticated grasp of the anti-Catholic forces he faced. The emerging strategy contained many elements that had served him well and would be sorely tested in the general election. Kennedy showed a willingness to admit his vulnerability regarding his Catholicism, to reach out to anti-Catholic Protestants...and to learn more about them. The listening sessions produced some direct public dividends, but they also gave the campaign insights into just how serious they had to take the threat (79).

On the flip side, the Nixon camp faced its own share of problems on the religion issue. To take advantage of the anti-Catholic sentiment by attacking Kennedy's faith out in the open would have proven fatal, but to ignore it entirely would be foolish. As a result, Nixon instead chose to work covertly with prominent Protestant leaders, in an effort to use their positions and status to attack Kennedy's Catholicism. Casey points out that Nixon relied heavily on the efforts of former Missouri congressman Orlando Armstrong, who "outlined a series of steps that the campaign could take in order to exploit Kennedy's Catholicism" (102). Paramount to his plan was to enlist the involvement of notable Protestant leaders and organizations like Billy Graham, Gerald Kennedy, Norman Vincent Peale, the National Association of Evangelicals, the Masons, and the POAU. By gaining their support, Nixon was able to leave the "dirty work" of attacking Kennedy's religion to Protestant leaders, who were more than willing to go to battle against a Catholic candidate.

One particular example used by Casey to illustrate the powerful impact of religion on the presidential race was the August, 1960 meeting of Protestant ministers at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D. C. It was here that several prominent religious leaders met to "put a public face on Protestant opposition to Kennedy's candidacy" (123). However, as Casey points out, the meeting (which had been organized primarily by Billy Graham and Norman Vincent Peale) turned out to be a public relation's nightmare for Nixon, who, despite having no official ties to the meeting or the Protestant leadership, was forced to disavow the meeting's pronouncements. Instead of shedding light on the "religion issue" as being a "a real and vital issue that must be handled in the spirit of truth, tolerance and fairness," as Peale had hoped, the meeting portrayed the Protestant opposition to Kennedy as a "bigoted" demonstration of ecclesiastical arrogance (143-144). For Casey, this was a "defining moment" in the final weeks of the election.

It was these last minute mistakes that allowed Kennedy to capitalize of the religion issue. In his final chapters, Casey outlines how the Kennedy campaign turned the issue in their favor by suggesting that the Protestant opposition was what the American people really needed to fear. Casey writes:

Here, Kennedy took the separation of church and state, the most powerful tool being used against him by Protestants, and turned it in his favor. He affirmed it categorically and proceeded to show how his detractors were in fact violating this principle in their attacks on him. He stated that he believed in a country that was not officially Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. No public official should request or accept instructions on public policy from the pope, the National Council of Churches, or any other ecclesiastical source. No religious body should seek to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the populace or public officials. Religious liberty should be so inviolable that an act against one church should be treated as an act against all (165-166).

By reversing the religion argument against his political opponents, Kennedy was able to successfully portray the pro-Nixon Protestant leadership as being guilty of the very same charges they had leveled against his campaign, and in the waning hours of the election, this provided all the momentum that Kennedy would need to emerge victorious.

In a nation where politics are literally saturated with religious overtones, Shaun Casey's The Making of a Catholic President serves as a poignant reminder of how the "religion question" can be better served when politicians seek understanding rather than public support from the ecclesiastical community. As Casey states in his conclusion:

Kennedy was not satisfied to accept that Protestant leaders were mostly against him. He and his brother Robert took the time to try and find out why this was the case. They did not seek formal endorsements from Protestant leaders; instead, they sought understanding. It would be a good thing for the U.S. polity if people seeking public office spent less time pandering for public support from religious leaders and more time listening to religious leaders talk about the concerns and aspirations of their organizations' members. If the United States is to make any progress in transcending the current political gridlock, conducting civil discourse across religious divides will be critical to that progress (204).