Viva Chile: The United States and the Chilean Coup of 1973

In the United States, September 11, 2001 is a date equated with terrible tragedy. Virtually every American who lived through that event remembers with horror they felt when they first saw the images of the burning Trade Towers and the Pentagon. That appalling event has been forever seared into the collective memory of American society in too many ways to mention. And though 9/11 has been unofficially claimed as a American day of mourning, the date has an even older meaning for a nation that is often forgotten in the muddle of world affairs. Twenty-eight years earlier, on September 11, 1973, the Chilean nation watched in disbelief as General Agusto Pinochet led an orchestrated coup to overthrow their socialist president Salvador Allende. With the same bewilderment that captivated Americans at the sight of the Trade Towers collapsing, the Chilean people were mesmerized as they witnessed the destruction of their government’s headquarters, known as La Moneda. They listened intently to Radio Agricultura’s broadcast of President Allende’s final words: “Viva Chile!” Shortly thereafter, Chileans came to the realization that September 11 would be a hallmark day in their own history, even though it is currently overshadowed by America’s tragedy.

How and why the Chilean Golpe del Estado (the Chilean coup) took place is both complicated and controversial. The convoluted makeup of Chilean politics, along with its struggling economy were certainly factors in the eventual overthrow, but they do not tell the whole story. Chile also found itself thrown onto the major stage of international politics, caught in a virtual tug-o-war between rival nations. Once the Marxist agenda of presidential candidate Salvador Allende gained serious support, the United States felt forced to intervene to protect its own interests. It was the political divisions within Chile, combined with the involvement of U.S. interests in shaping Chilean politics that created an atmosphere of political tension, and was the major catalyst for the Chilean coup of 1973.

While it is true that the shaping of Chilean politics and government began in the nineteenth century, the major factors are more modern. During the 1960s and 1970s, Chile was a nation with a strong tradition of democratic elections and practices. By the early 1960s, Chilean politics had become diverse and complex. Five major political parties had formed within Chile, each promising economic prosperity to the people: The extreme right of Chilean politics consisted of the liberals and conservatives, who merged to form the National Party, the Radical Party and the Christian Democratic Party were predominantly centrist parties, and the Socialist and Communist Parties made up the extreme left. The majority of Chilean people during the early 1960s favored the center of the political spectrum, in particular the Christian Democratic Party. In 1964 the party won the Chilean presidency with the strong leadership of Eduardo Frei. Frei promised the Chilean people sweeping reforms and economic prosperity. By the latter end of the decade, however, the party had lost momentum. Their inability to establish a coalition with the Radical Party (the party that most closely shared their views) spelled the beginning of the end for the Democratic Christian Party.

The economy also remained a problematic issue for the Chilean government. Compared to other Latin American nations, the Chilean economy was at the higher echelon, but was also on the decline. Soaring inflation rates festered the Chilean economy. In fact, From 1972-1974, Chilean inflation rates were the worst on the planet. The Democratic Christian Party had worked tirelessly to redirect the course of the economy, but met with only minimal success. As a result, the door was opened to the other political parties to seize power.

By 1970, Chilean politics were ripe for change. The political left began gaining new support for its agenda, promising a new prosperous era for the nation. At the head of the Socialist agenda was Salvador Allende. Allende had been in government for many years, and had even run for President three times before. His agenda had always lacked the support that the Democratic Christians enjoyed, and as a result, Allende was never able to achieve the presidency.

The Presidential election of 1970 gave Allende and the Socialists a golden opportunity to finally win. The political right of Chilean politics had lost support, and President Frei of the Democratic Christians was unable to run again for the presidency (the Chilean constitution allowed a person to serve as President for one term of six years). With Frei’s departure, the Democratic Christians had nobody as popular to run against Allende. The left nominated Jorge Alessandri, a former Chilean president, while the Democratic Christians nominated the unknown and unpopular Radomiro Tomic. For once it looked as though Allende had a serious chance to win the election

International reaction to the Chilean election was diverse. The United States took a strong stance opposing the Allende campaign. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger stated that Allende’s strongest ambition was for Chile and Cuba to unite, and to “create the revolution in Latin America.” The very idea that socialist governments could spring up in Latin America was unacceptable to the United States, which had already been embroiled in problems with Cuba. To make matters worse, Allende, in the words of Kissinger, desired to “undermine U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere by violence if necessary.” Kissinger’s concerns with Salvador Allende’s intentions prove problematic, when compared with the statements of the U.S. ambassador to Chile. In January of 1970 Edward Korry, the U.S ambassador to Chile, told the Nixon Administration that the dangers Chile posed to the United States were greatly exaggerated. “I see little that will endanger U.S. real interests in the country, in the area, or in the hemisphere.” Kissinger’s attitudes toward Chilean government officials also indicate a level of arrogance. In a meeting with Gabriel Valdes, the Chilean foreign minister, Kissinger stated that, “Nothing important can come from the South…The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, and crosses over to Washington.” Valdes replied to Kissinger’s comments with, “Mr. Kissinger, you know nothing of the South.” Kissinger then rudely ended the conversation with, “And I don’t care.”

Despite Kissinger’s comments that the Southern hemisphere was irrelevant in world affairs, the Nixon Administration clearly took note of what was transpiring in Chile. Allende’s promises to nationalize the Chilean copper mines and other assets unnerved White House officials. American businesses within Chile (particularly in the copper industry) quickly developed a sense of fear that if Allende were to win, they would lose all they had worked for.

It was under these circumstances that the Nixon Administration decided to act. President Nixon authorized the CIA to provide any needed support to oppose Allende. This entailed monetary aid given to Allende’s opponents. The aid given to Allende’s opponents was in response to the alleged aid given to Allende from Cuba. The CIA had reported that Cuba had pumped $350,000 into the Allende campaign, and that Fidel Castro himself was helping to lead the charge to get Allende elected. For the United States, it seemed as though Chile was the stage for a much greater, and on-going fight with Communism.

Despite the efforts of the CIA and other U.S. officials, Salvador Allende was democratically elected the president of Chile on September 4, 1970. The official election results gave Allende 36% of the vote, while Alessandri gained 34% and Tomic 27%. Regardless of the fact that Allende had won in a constitutionally and democratically sound election, the Nixon Administration still saw his elections as, “a challenge to our national interest.” The mere thought that a second Cuba could be on the horizon caused U.S. officials to find another solution to the Chilean crisis. As Henry Kissinger stated, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”

It was under these circumstances that the Nixon Administration and the CIA corroborated with Chilean officials to seek an alternative to Allende. Initially, it was hoped that a loophole in the Chilean Constitution would provide the answer. According to the Chilean Constitution, any president elected without a majority (51%) had to be elected in the Chilean Congress. Tradition had always obligated the Congress to affirm the winner of the popular vote, but under these circumstances, the U.S. hoped to change precedence. The plan called for the Chilean Congress to elect the runner up (Alessandri) to the Presidency. Alessandri would then step down, and another election (one in which former president Eduardo Frei would be eligible for) would be held. The United States banked on the hope that Frei’s popularity, coupled with U.S. backing, would carry him past Allende in the new elections. President Nixon justified the U.S. response by pointing out the fact that Allende had only been elected by 1/3 of the popular vote. Nixon also stated that the U.S. had every right to conduct secret operations in other nations to protect U.S. interests, since the Soviets were doing the same thing. Despite the intentions of the United States, Soviets, and Cubans, the fact remains that nobody seemed to care that the Chilean people had voted democratically.

It is strange even today to think that the United State, a nation that presumably devotes all its efforts to defend democracy and liberty for all, would go to such great lengths to suppress that very process in Chile. In his memoirs, President Nixon explained this by stating the following:

We live in a far from ideal world. As long as Communists supply external funds to support political parties, factions or individuals in other countries, I believe the U.S. can and should do the same and do it secretly so that it can be effective. Under Communists standards, of morality, governments are meant to be subverted and elections influenced. To me it would have been the height of immorality to allow the Soviets, the Cubans, and other Communist nations to interfere with impunity in free elections while America stayed its hand.

Clearly, Nixon felt justified in impeding a democratic election simply because a rival was involved. This serves as a perfect example of the complexity of U.S. foreign affairs during the Cold War.

Despite the best efforts of U.S. officials to persuade the Chilean Congress not to vote for Allende, the Chilean Congress followed precedent and elected him president. Before his election, however, congress obligated Allende to agree to certain terms that would guarantee the future security of Chilean democracy. In response to his election, the Nixon Administration debated on the proper course of action. Edward Korry, the U.S. ambassador to Chile, had suggested to the White House that a coup involving the Chilean military was a possibility. This excited members of the Nixon Administration, who were still simmering over the Allende election. Korry’s plan called for the CIA to help fund several high-ranking generals in the Chilean Army to organize and overthrow President Allende. Once accomplished, the Chilean government would be able to hold new elections.

Unfortunately for U.S. officials, the plan to overthrow Allende via a military coup was shot down. Korry reported to the White House that most Chilean generals were unwilling to conspire or accept bribes from the United States, and that most generals simply wanted to “adjust” to Allende’s agenda. Rene Schneider, Commanding General of the Army, was a particular problem to the plan. Schneider had promised earlier that any effort of the Congress to disallow Allende the presidency would meet with his disapproval. Schneider also made his stance clear that he strongly supported the Chilean election process, and would not allow anything to interfere with the will of the people. Just a few days after making such comments, General Schneider was killed in an attempted kidnapping. Chilean officials immediately blamed the U.S. and CIA for the assassination, claiming it was backed by U.S. funds. Even though Nixon and Kissinger denied involvement, CIA records indicated that the U.S. did indeed provide weapons and funding. Despite the many efforts of the U.S. to oust Allende, it looked as though he was there to stay.

The reality that Allende was going to maintain his power was almost too much for the White House to bear. Henry Kissinger had even claimed that Allende’s rise to power, “posed for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere.” Kissinger had made it clear to President Nixon that Allende’s victory caused unimaginable “political and psychological losses to the U.S.” Under these circumstances, the Nixon Administration took a hard stance against the Allende government. The U.S. government maintained close contact with Chilean military officials that were against Allende, and adopted strong economic strategies meant to choke the already struggling Chilean economy. American businessmen were warned to stay away, due to the unstable government, and Chile was quickly subjected to economic isolation.

At first Allende’s government gave a glimmer of hope to the Chilean people. During his first year in power the Chilean economy experienced unprecedented growth. Salary readjustment laws put more money in the pockets of Chilean citizens, gross national product surged 8.3%, industrial production soared 12.1%, unemployment fell 8.3%, and inflation dropped dramatically. Much of the sudden economic prosperity can be credited to Allende’s nationalization of the Chilean copper industry.

Chile’s economic prosperity did not last for long. After 1972, inflation began to rise and unemployment returned to previous levels. Allende’s inability to maintain the economic prosperity of 1972 was mostly due to American economic boycotts and a dramatic drop in the price of copper worldwide. The White House received constant information on the Chilean situation and was elated at the fact that Allende’s world seemed to be crumbling. Quickly, the United States moved to capitalize on Chile’s economic misfortune. The CIA dumped more than $6 million dollars to aid Allende’s opponents in the Chilean government, particularly in the military. The U.S. also hoped that the new Chilean Congress would move to impeach Allende based on his recent failures. Though impeachment efforts proved futile, U.S. officials were pleased to learn that many Chilean military officials were considering a coup. The Chilean economy had been pushed to the brink, massive protests had irrupted in the streets, and Allende seemed more like a deer in the headlights than the brave leader Chileans had hoped for.

The end came quickly for Allende. On September 11, 1973, Chilean military forces under the direction of Agusto Pinochet took control of the capital. Allende, who was hunkered down in the Presidential headquarters (La Moneda) gave his final farewell to the nation. Shortly thereafter, Allende found dead. Allegedly, Allende had shot himself with the very rifle given to him by his Cuban hero Fidel Castro. The Nixon Administration responded to the coup by claiming it had no involvement. Henry Kissinger commented that United States, “does not support revolutions as a means of settling disputes.” White House officials gave support for the Pinochet coup, calling the General “mild-mannered, businesslike, hard working, honest and dedicated.” Even when reports that Pinochet had ordered the deaths of thousands of Chilean people, Henry Kissinger claimed that Pinochet was simply dealing with “lingering terrorism.” Instead of being called a ruthless usurper of power, Pinochet was hailed as a patriot, called to protect his mother country. Whether they admit it or not, the Nixon Administration had participated (in one form or another) in the successful overthrow of a democratically elected government, and saw that government replaced with a military dictatorship.

The story of the Chilean coup of 1973 is deeply controversial and complicated. There is no doubt that much of this story is still yet to be unraveled. As time has passed, Chilean people (and people around the world) have divided opinions of Allende, U.S. involvement in Chile, and Pinochet. Some see Allende as a villain, while Pinochet is seen as a liberator. Others see Allende as a martyr and the United States as an evil empire, pushing its agenda on weaker nations. Regardless of personal feelings, the Chilean coup of 1973 serves as a perfect example of the complex world of U.S. foreign policy. The complex world of Chilean politics, the emergence of Allende and his agenda, and the involvement of the United States to protect its interests all molded together to create the coup of 1973. One can only hope that current and future leaders will learn from past events like Chile. Perhaps then we will think twice before getting involved in other nation’s affairs to protect our “interests.”

Book Review: Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century

Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. By Benjamin Valentino. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pp. viii, 253).

The twentieth century was the bloodiest in all of human history. The consequences of two world wars left a haunting impression upon the millions of survivors, who became reluctant witnesses to the atrocities of modern warfare. Along with the millions of war victims is another body of mass casualties that is often forgotten in the muddle of twentieth century history. The approximately 60-150 million victims of genocide across the world stand as a monument to the carnage of numerous regimes that embraced mass killing as a necessity. In his book, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century, author Benjamin Valentino attempts to address the causes and motivations that have inspired genocide in the twentieth century. By essentially addressing genocide as nothing more than a “powerful political and military tool,” Valentino provides the reader with a detailed perspective into the motives behind genocide.

First off, it is important to recognize the fact that Valentino’s work avoids a discussion of semantics when dealing with the definition of genocide. Instead, the author’s book centers on “mass killings” of more than fifty thousand in number (Pp. 3-4). In so doing, Valentino broadens the scope of his argument by including numerous mass killings that are often ignored in the traditional study of genocide. Valentino also argues that the traditional understanding of genocide as being motivated by “severe ethnic, racial, national, or religious divisions” does not hold up, since “some of the bloodiest mass killings in history have occurred in relatively homogeneous societies” (Pp. 2). Valentino continues his assault on the traditional historiography of genocide by also suggesting that the “traditional studies of genocide have tended to diminish the role of leadership on the grounds that the interests and ideas of a few elites cannot account for the participation of the rest of society in the violence” (Pp. 2). Instead, Valentino proposes in his research that mass killing “occurs when leaders believe that their victims pose a threat that can be countered only by removing them from society or by permanently destroying their ability to organize” (Pp. 5).

To defend his thesis that leaders are responsible for mass killing as opposed to the masses, Valentino provides a detailed comparison between several similar regimes. For example, Valentino makes special mention of the racial tensions that permeated both German and South African society, along with the various forms of intolerance that covered Asia After briefly discussing the backgrounds of these regimes, Valentino poses a question to his audience: Why does mass killing occur in only some of these regimes, which, on the surface, appear to be very similar? Valentino then answers his question by suggesting that a cohesive leadership of elites, with an objective to consolidate their power, is the catalyst for mass killing. By pointing out that perpetrators of mass killing see their actions as, “a rational way to counter threats or implement certain types of ideologies,” Valentino discards the assumption that these regimes kill simply for the sake of killing.

To support his claims, Valentino focuses on three distinct groups of mass killings: communist, ethnic and counterguerrilla mass killings. In the first of these three classifications (which Valentino claims is responsible for the largest number of mass killings), Valentino focuses on the communist regimes of China, the Soviet Union and Cambodia. Valentino then points out the fact that these regimes have resorted to mass killings in an effort to secure that their social changes are met. As Valentino points out, “the effort to engineer utopia has been the justification for some of the world’s most horrendous crimes” (Pp. 92). For communist regimes to secure this “utopia,” they are often required to redistribute land and wealth, which is understandably a difficult change for the masses to accept. For this reason, communist regimes have embarked on some of the worst mass killing policies in world history. As Valentino points out, “The history of communism in the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia is a powerful demonstration of the degree to which historical accidents, serendipity, and the power of individual personalities can determine the rise of extremely radical and violent groups’ (Pp. 150).

In his second group, ethnic mass killings, Valentino pays special attention to the Nazi regime and its motivations for committing to a policy of ethnic mass killings. Valentino emphasizes the fact that the Nazi regime (along with other regimes that are guilty of mass killings) had a specific strategic goal in mind, as opposed to the traditional assumption that they were simply out for blood. As Valentino writes, “Ethnic mass killings, especially the Holocaust, have tended to be portrayed as little more than killing for killing’s sake…The strategic approach, however, suggests that ethnic mass killing occurs when leaders come to believe that large-scale violence is the most practical way to accomplish a policy of ethnic cleansing” (Pp. 155). By focusing on the ethnic cleansing of Turkish Armenia, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda, Valentino provides his audience with ample insight into the evolution of how these regimes came to embrace mass killings as the only plausible solution to their respective ethnic dilemmas.

In the third group of mass killings addressed in his work, counterguerilla mass killings, Valentino discusses how a number of guerilla insurgencies (particularly in Guatemala and Afghanistan) have compelled governments to adopt a policy of mass killing. Valentino points out the fact that these forms of mass killing often come about not because an army becomes undisciplined or fed-up with the guerilla opposition it faces. Instead, Valentino suggests that counterguerilla forces often see their efforts as being “positive policies designed to improve the lives of the civilian population and draw support away from guerillas” (Pp. 199). In essence, the justification for such actions embraces the notion that one must kill in order to save.

Though often contrary to the traditional understanding of genocide, Valentino’s work provides us with a unique perspective into the causes and motivations behind mass killings. By suggesting that mass killings are primarily the result of an elite leadership, Valentino also proposes that we can better prevent these atrocities from happening again, by being proactive against regimes that have committed to the rapid disposal of a specific group from their society. An objective insight into the causes of mass killing, which Valentino considers to be born out of a political motivation to eliminate a perceived threat as opposed to simple hatred, may serve to prevent future atrocities from ever happening again

The (Socialist) Pledge of Allegiance

In today's political world, words like "socialism," "fascism" and "communism" have become popular "scary words" used by extremists to vilify their political rivals. These "scary words" have been used in such a way that it has become extremely difficult to separate the true meanings behind these words from the nonsense associated with them. After all, when idiots like Glenn Beck label everyone from Obama, Alexander Hamilton, Stalin, Hitler, McCain, Oprah, etc. as "socialists" it becomes very difficult to take anything these extremists say seriously. Usually it is these same extremists who insist that the very fabric of America's "Christian" heritage is eroding below our feet, thanks to the "evil, fascist, Nazi, Maoist, socialist" meany-heads that are now in power. Often they appeal to obscure and random quotes from the Founding Fathers (or Ronald Reagan) to prove their point, which usually invokes a powerful emotional response from fellow radicals (tea-baggers) who quickly rally behind some misspelled and misinformed protest sign:


Yes, truly Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert will never run out of material so long as the tea-baggers keep pretending that they are modern day Minutemen and Sons of Liberty!

But when it comes to dramatic demonstrations of public devotion to God and country, the "tea parties," political rallies and even Glenn Beck's daily nonsense circus take a back seat to the "crown jewel" of patriotic liturgy: the Pledge of Allegiance. And though I am a fan of the Pledge of Allegiance, I do find it ironic that these same tea-bagging, sign-waving, Obama-hating, socialist-loathing, intellectually challenged "MORANS" are at the vanguard of supporting such a socialist institution. Yep, you heard me right, the Pledge of Allegiance is...wait for it...SOCIALIST!!!

Or at least its creator was. In 1892, in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' "discovery" of America (whether Columbus deserves his own holiday is a topic for another day, one that I have written about here and here), Francis Bellamy, a popular Baptist minister and Christian socialist, was asked to draft words for a flag pledge that would be used to bolster the schoolhouse flag movement. The recitation of the pledge was also to be accompanied by the "Bellamy Salute" (as depicted in the picture at the top of this post), but was later changed during World War II to simply placing ones hand over their heart for obvious reasons.

The original words to Bellamy's first pledge are very interesting and would surely horrify every wannabe Paul Revere tea fanatic:

I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the republic for which it stands, one nation indivisible, with equality and fraternity for all.

Equality and fraternity are a noteworthy selection of words. After all, they are two of the three words (Liberté, égalité, fraternité) used in the national motto of France; a motto that originated in their revolution. In addition, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were also key words (scary words to the tea-sippers) in the Christan socialist movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Bellamy was a passionate voice for socialism and advocated for complete government control of education in America. In addition, it was his hope that the pledge would become a standard practice in all public schools. His wish was granted in 1940 when the Supreme Court, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis ruled that all students, including Jehovah's Witnesses who detested the pledge on the basis that it was idolatrous and made a graven image out of the flag, were required to swear the pledge.

Now, it should go without saying (contrary to what some of those tea lovers may say) that the phrase "under God" was not a part of the first pledge. In fact, "under God" was not officially added to the pledge until 1954, when President Eisenhower and Congress passed a joint resolution making it the official pledge of the nation.

And while I revere the pledge for its basic principles of devotion to God and country, I cannot help but chuckle at the fact that so many fanatics, who find socialism lurking under every rock in the same way that McCarthy found communism in the 50s, support the pledge with such blind loyalty. You'd think that the pledge of a devout Christian socialist would turn them off. Heck, even their fearless "brainiac" leader, Glenn Beck, has convinced many to leave churches for the preaching of "social justice." Just imagine what Beck would think of Bellamy's "Jesus the Socialist" and "The Bible Teaches Socialism" sermons.

Now, in fairness to Bellamy, there's a lot of crap out there on the net which suggests that Bellamy "inspired" Hitler and the Nazi Party. This is simply spaghetti being tossed at the wall to see what sticks. There's no evidence for such a stupid conclusion, so please spare us the socialist, Marxist, fascist, Nazi conspiracy theories. Let's not throw out the baby with the bathwater!

Here are a few video clips of the PoA from the past. Notice what has changed? What is missing?